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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
FRANK LYLE DOMINGUEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20010649-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to the "pour-over" provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(j) 
(Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Should this Court reject defendant's plain error challenge to two pre-
trial evidentiary rulings where he provides no legal analysis to support 
his claim? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
II. Should this Court reject defendant's challenges to the admission of 
evidence concerning his parole status, his prison status, and his 1996 
prior conviction where he provides neither record cites nor legal 
authority to support them? 
No standard of review applies to these issue. 
III. Should this Court reject defendant's challenge to the admission of 
Terry Brown's statements after she was found unavailable where 
defendant did not preserve his claim below and does not argue plain 
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
IV. Did the trial court properly reject defendant's mistrial motion where 
defendant did not object while three witnesses laid the foundation for 
the allegedly inadmissible evidence and then failed to request that the 
jury be excused before conducting the voir dire that elicited that 
evidence? 
"'A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial will not be reversed absent an 
abuse of discretion.'" State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, f 36,47 P.3d 115 (quoting 
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 54,28 P.3d 1278). 
V. Should this Court reverse defendant's conviction based on cumulative 
error where defendant has not shown that any error occurred or that 
their prejudicial effect was sufficient to undermine the outcome of 
defendant's trial? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are dispositive of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 23, 2001, defendant was charged by amended information with murder, a 
first degree felony, and with use of a firearm during the commission of that murder (R. 
71). After a five-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 168-69). 
Defendant was sentenced to six-years-to-life in the Utah State Prison, to run 
consecutively to his sentence on a previous felony conviction (R. 183-84). Defendant 
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timely appealed (R. 186). The supreme court transferred the matter to this Court for 
disposition (R. 194). After briefing by the parties was complete, defendant was appointed 
new counsel (Addendum A). Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, this Court reset the 
matter for rebriefing by new counsel (Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 15, 2000, at approximately 12:30 p.m., defendant walked into the 
Boulevard Market in Ogden, followed the store owner into a back room, and fatally shot 
him three times in the head (R. 203:102-03, 146, 152). Defendant then returned to a 
family party where he boasted of his feat (R. 203:78-80, 84, 92,102-03). 
***** 
Waleed Mohamd Elalawnah ("Wally"), the owner of the Boulevard Market, was 
well-known in the community (R. 203:8, 10). A neighbor described him as a generous 
person who had assisted her in times of need (R. 203:8). Indeed, shortly after noon on 
October 15, 2000, Wally was outside his store enjoying a break, smoking a cigarette and 
drinking a cup of coffee, when this friend passed by (R. 203:10-11). They waved at each 
other (R. 203:11). 
Moments later, Wally was dead (R. 203:33-34, 39-40, 51-52). At approximately 
12:30 p.m., defendant approached Wally and followed him into the store—first following 
him to the front of the store and then to the ice-machine in a room in the back (R. 
204:103, 117, 119). As Wally turned away from defendant, approached the ice-machine, 
knelt down, and began scooping ice cubes, he told defendant to stop threatening him and 
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that "he was going to call the police" (R. 203:224; R. 204:103-04, 111,119, 120, 167). 
Defendant, angry that Wally was ignoring him, pulled a gun from his front pants pocket, 
pointed it at Wally's head, and, standing just behind Wally and to his right, opened fire 
(R. 204:104, 108, 111,119-20). 
As Wally began to fall, defendant kept his gun focused on Wally's head, "shooting 
the gun until it stop[ed], til he c[ould]n't shoot it no more" (R. 204:104,112,119-20, 
121). Three of defendant's four shots hit their target (R. 203:69,149,151-53,188-89). 
One hit Wally near the right ear, traveled through his brain, and came to rest in his left 
cheek (R. 203:149). A second entered behind Wally's right eye and collapsed both of his 
eyes before coming to rest in his left sinus cavity (R. 203:150-51). The third shot, fired 
from very close range, went from Wally's right cheek to the back of his throat, coming to 
rest on the left side of Wally's neck (R. 203:153). Wally's blood spilled into the ice 
bucket and splattered onto the ice machine door (R. 203:223,225). Wally died shortly 
thereafter (R. 203:40,47-48,50-52). 
Defendant returned to the front of the store, on the way hitting a white vertical 
store column with his gloved hand (R. 204:105, 125). Once up front, defendant noticed a 
black gym bag with money in it (R. 204:105-06). He grabbed the bag and left the store 
(R. 204:105). 
After disposing of his gun, his gloves, and a paper bag he had used to store the 
gun, defendant returned to his grandmother's house and re-joined the family birthday 
party he had left earlier that day (R. 203:77-80, 92, 102; R. 204:126-28). After he 
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returned, his grandmother and uncle heard him dragging , . . that he had shot somebody" 
to the children and family members congregated on the outside porch (R. 203:78, 102-
03). When police were called to the party later that day because of a family quarrel, 
defendant hid in the basement of the house until they left (R. 203:84; R. 205:91-92, 161). 
During a report of Wally's murder on the news later that evening, defendant's uncle heard 
defendant admit that he had committed the murder (R. 203:102-03). 
A few days later, police were called to a different residence because of alleged 
drug activity (R. 204:60-61). The police found defendant and two women at the 
residence (R. 204:61). When the police asked defendant his name, defendant told them 
he was Matt Rader (R. 204:62). When defendant later admitted his true name, he was 
arrested for giving false information to police and for an outstanding warrant (R. 204:62). 
While held on these charges, defendant initiated contact with the police and 
confessed to the Boulevard Market murder (R. 204:63-64,102-05,107-08). Subsequent 
analysis of the shorts he admitted wearing during the shooting indicated the presence of 
gun powder residue consistent with having recently discharged a firearm (R. 204:16-17, 
50). While awaiting trial, defendant threatened a corrections officer that "someday I'll 
get my hands on you and kill you like I did that other motherfucker" (R. 205:45, 51). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant challenges two pre-trial evidentiary rulings (1) restricting the 
State's ability to reference defendant's parole status at the time he was arrested, and (2) 
allowing the State to present evidence concerning defendant's incarceration at the time he 
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threatened a corrections officer. Defendant claims the evidence allowed by these rulings 
was inadmissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Because defendant did not raise his 404(b) claim below, he succeeds on appeal 
only if he can show plain error. To show plain error, defendant must establish that (1) an 
error occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error 
was prejudicial to him. Here, defendant provides no legal authority or analysis to support 
his claim. Thus, he does not establish error, let alone obvious error. Consequently, his 
claim fails. 
Issue II. Defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning 
(I) his parole status at the time he was arrested, and (2) his prison status at the time he 
threatened a corrections officer. Because defendant did not raise his claims below, they 
are reviewed only for plain error. Here, defendant provides neither record cites nor legal 
authority to support his claims. Thus, he does not establish error, let alone obvious error. 
Consequently, his claims fail. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning details of 
his 1996 conviction for a drive-by shooting. However, defendant fails to provide any 
legal support for his claim. Thus, his claim fails. 
Issue III. Defendant claims that the trial court erred when, after finding Teresa 
Brown unavailable as a witness, it allowed Detective Weloth to testify as to statements 
she made in a signed statement to police. Defendant claims that, prior to admitting the 
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statements, the court was required to consider whether they were admissible under rule 
804(b)(5)(B) and (C). 
Defendant did not preserve this claim below. Thus, defendant was required to 
argue plain error or exceptional circumstances before his claim could be considered on 
appeal. Here, defendant has not argued plain error or exceptional circumstances. Thus, 
this Court should not reach his claim. 
Issue IV. Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial 
after the jury heard evidence concerning defendant's attempts to enter into a plea bargain. 
However, defendant never objected to the three foundational witnesses who preceded the 
evidence, despite their alerting defendant to the evidence sought to be admitted. 
Moreover, it was defendant himself who placed evidence of his plea offer before the jury 
when, in the presence of the jury, he conducted voir dire of the third witness, who had 
transcribed defendant's offer. Under such circumstances, the trial court properly ruled 
that any error in letting the jury know of the attempted plea bargain was invited error that 
could not support a mistrial motion. Thus, defendant's claim fails. 
Issue V. Defendant claims that the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors in 
this case requires reversal of his conviction. However, defendant has failed to establish 
that any error occurred. Moreover, in light of the compelling evidence against him in this 
case, defendant cannot show that the errors he now claims, even if they did occur, were 
prejudicial. Thus, defendant's cumulative error claim fails. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S PLAIN ERROR 
CHALLENGE TO TWO PRE-TRIAL EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
WHERE HE PROVIDES NO LEGAL ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT HIS 
CLAIM 
Defendant challenges two pre-trial rulings by the trial court. First, defendant 
claims the trial court erred in ruling that evidence of his parole status at the time he was 
arrested and initiated a confession to police was admissible. Aplt. Br. at 21-22. Second, 
he claims the trial court erred in ruling that evidence of his prison status at the time he 
threatened a corrections officer was admissible. Aplt. Br. at 21-22. Defendant argues this 
evidence should have been excluded under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. 
Br. at 22-24. 
Because defendant did not raise this claim below, his claim succeeds on appeal 
only if he can show plain error. To show plain error, defendant must demonstrate (1) that 
an error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) 
that the error was prejudicial. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
Here, defendant has not adequately briefed his claim. Thus, defendant has not 
shown error, let alone obvious error, in the trial court's ruling. 
A. Proceedings below 
Prior to trial, the State asked the trial court for clarification on the extent to which 
evidence concerning defendant's parole status at the time of his arrest and his prison 
status at the time he threatened a correctional officer was admissible. 
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The State explained that defendant's murder charge arose after he had been 
arrested in an unrelated incident for giving a false name to police and for an outstanding 
felony warrant for absconding from parole (R. 201:10). On his way to the police station 
after being arrested on these charges, defendant told the transporting officer that he 
wanted to provide information about the Boulevard Market murder in return for not being 
charged on his current violations (R. 201:10-11). Shortly thereafter, defendant "went 
through a series of stories" before finally admitting that he had committed the murder 
himself (R. 201:11). The State explained, "[o]bviously, in putting on that evidence, there 
would need to be some explanation as to how it is we found the defendant and how it is 
that conversation got started" (R. 201:11). "So that was my first question in regards to 
whether or not [defendant was] keeping—intending to keep from the jury that he was a 
parolee" (R. 201:11). 
The State then explained that it also intended to present evidence concerning a 
threat to a corrections officer that defendant made after he was arrested. The State 
indicated that, on the date of the threat, defendant was involved in "an administrative 
function" during which he became upset and threatened the officer (R. 201:12). Again, 
the State argued, "[o]bviously we cannot put [the officers] on and go through any type of 
a foundation of who they are and where they work and how this statement came about 
without disclosing that the defendant's being housed at the Utah State Prison" (R. 
201:12). Thus, the State asked for "guidance and direction from the Court... as to how 
to proceed" (R. 201:12). 
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Defendant responded: "I think the—the first issue of why he came into—why he 
came to be in—in police custody and—and gave information and was questioned on this 
case in the first place, I think that the State can present its evidence without having to 
explain why he was there" (R. 210:12-13). Concerning the second issue, defendant 
stated: 
. . . Frankly, I don't—if—if they—we don't think that that 
confession is necessary, but I obviously can't—we couldn't constrict 
the State on how it presents its evidence and what it presents, if the 
Court deems it to be relevant. 
I mean, my position as defense counsel is that it's perhaps 
more prejudicial than probative, but I've spoken with the defendant 
about it. He understands that that information has already been out 
in the newspapers and so we don't—with that, we'd just submit the 
issue. 
(R. 201:13). The trial court ruled: 
. . . In my opinion, the second issue is the easiest. I think that 
that comes in—comes in in the context in which it was made. No 
one has to go into the reasons as to why he's being housed there. 
That's, you know, irrelevant. The fact is that's where that statement 
occurred . . . and I—I just simply think that that has to be in context. 
In regards to the first statement in regards to being on parole, 
I don't' know why that is necessary . . . . I do think that, you know, 
you can discuss the discussions they had without necessarily going 
into why he is on parole ...—now, if they came up in his 
discussions and he brought those up, they came up in his discussions 
. . . and if they bring those prejudicial things in, I don't think you 
have to excise those from your statement. 
(R. 201:14-15). 
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B. Defendant's inadequate briefing fails to establish plain error. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's 
brief "shall contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Implicitly," that rule "requires not just bald citation to 
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham, 
772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989). Thus, under rule 24(a)(9), this Court "'is entitled to have 
the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. 
Montoya, 937 P.2d 145,150 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). . 
The requirements of rule 24(a)(9) are particularly stringent when defendant raises 
a claim under the plain error doctrine. Under that doctrine, a defendant must show not 
only that an error occurred, but that such error should have been obvious to the trial court. 
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). Defendant meets that burden 
only if he can cite to "settled appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951 
P.2d 236,239 (Utah App. 1997); see also State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, f 22, 53 
P.3d 486; State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 6, 18 P.3d 1123 ("To show obviousness of 
the error, [defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of trial."). Thus, 
failure to provide legal support is fatal to any plain error claim. 
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In this case, defendant provides no legal support for his claim. Defendant's whole 
argument consists of citation to rule 404(b), a generally applicable rule of evidence, and 
two cases outlining the analysis required when applying that rule. Aplt. Br. at 22-24. 
Nowhere does he "cit[e] to authority" holding that rule 404(b) applies to the evidence at 
issue here, let alone "develop[] that authority" and provide "reasoned analysis based 
[thereon]." Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. Moreover, defendant provides no legal analysis 
from which to conclude that the trial court's prison status ruling, if error at all, was not 
invited error (R. 201:13 (defense counsel telling court: "I obviously can't —we couldn't 
constrict the State on how it presents its evidence and what it presents, if this Court deems 
it to be relevant"). See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997) (holding that, "[i]f 
a party through counsel... has led the trial court into error, [this Court] will then decline 
to save that party from the error") (citation omitted). 
Without such authority, defendant can hardly establish error, let alone obvious, 
uninvited, and prejudicial error. Consequently, defendant's plain error claim fails. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES 
TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING HIS 
PAROLE STATUS, HIS PRISON STATUS, AND HIS 1996 PRIOR 
CONVICTION WHERE HE PROVIDES NEITHER RECORD CITES 
NOR LEGAL AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT THEM 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing the State to elicit evidence 
concerning his parole status at the time he was arrested, his prison status at the time he 
threatened a corrections officer, and his 1996 conviction for a drive-by shooting. Aplt. 
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Br. at 24-27. This Court should reject defendant's inadequately briefed claims because 
they fail to establish error. 
A. This Court should reject defendant's inadequately briefed parole 
status claim where he provides neither record cites nor legal 
authority to show plain error. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence 
that, prior to his arrest, "defendant was wanted by the parole authorities, that he had 
absconded, and that he was hiding from the police and from the parole authorities." Aplt. 
Br. at 27. 
Defendant claims that he preserved this claim below during a pre-trial hearing at 
which the trial court ruled that, when presenting evidence concerning defendant's initial 
confession, the State could not disclose that the confession arose after defendant had been 
arrested for absconding from parole (R. 201:14-15). Aplt. Br. at 24-25. As set forth 
below, the State adhered to the trial court's ruling when it presented no evidence of 
defendant's parole status in its case-in-chief. Because the State adhered to the trial 
court's ruling, defendant was required to enter a new objection if evidence of defendant's 
parole status was admitted in a different context. Cf. State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, f 
15, 54 P.2d 645 (holding requirement for specific, timely objection "'arises out of the trial 
court's need to assess allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in the 
context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue'" (citation omitted)). Because 
defendant admits that he did not enter any new objection, he did not preserve his claim 
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below. Thus, his claim is reviewed only for plain error. Because defendant's 
inadequately briefed claim does not establish error, let alone obvious error, his claim fails. 
1. Proceedings below 
Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that, in presenting evidence concerning 
defendant's confession after he was arrested on unrelated charges on October 19, the 
State could not elicit evidence concerning defendant's parole status at the time he was 
arrested (R. 201:14-15, 16), Specifically, the court ruled: 
. . . It isn't necessary to explain that he's on parole. You just 
explain the discussion that occurred and who was present and what 
the people were there for. 
I think that, you know, all you can do is bring up what 
the defendant brought up. I don't think you can paint the 
picture of everything else-
(R. 201:14-15, 16). 
Consistent with the trial court's ruling, the State presented no evidence during its 
case-in-chief that defendant was a parolee at the time he was arrested on October 19, 
2001. Officer Jason Thomas was the only officer to testify as to the events surrounding 
defendant's arrest. Thomas testified that on that date, Ogden City police officers 
responded to a complaint that people were using drugs in front of children at a local 
residence (R. 204:60-61). Police found defendant and two women at the residence (R. 
204:61). When asked his name, defendant told Thomas he was Matt Rader (R. 204:62). 
After additional questioning, defendant admitted his true name (R. 204:62). Defendant 
was subsequently arrested on an outstanding warrant and for providing false information 
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to the police (R. 204:62). While being transported to jail, defendant told Thomas that he 
wanted to give the police information on the Boulevard Market murder so that he 
wouldn't be charged on the false information and outstanding warrant (R. 204:63-64). 
Thomas then explained that he could not help defendant but that he would arrange for 
defendant to talk with a detective (R. 204:65-66). 
Kevin Mann was the first detective to meet with defendant after his arrest (R. 
206:42). Mann testified that defendant stated he wanted to give information about the 
Boulevard Market murder in exchange for not going back to prison (R. 204:69). Mann, 
who didn't know what defendant had been arrested for, told defendant he couldn't make 
any promises (R. 204:69). Defendant subsequently accused two women of doing the 
killing before eventually admitting that he was the killer (R. 204:70-77, 89-105). 
In his defense, defendant called his grandfather, Frank Dominguez, Sr. (R. 
205:85). On direct examination, the grandfather was asked where defendant was living 
on the day of the murder (R. 205:87-88). The grandfather answered that defendant was 
living with him, "He had run away from the halfway house in Salt Lake" (R. 205:88, 92). 
Defense counsel then asked whether the police had been called to his house during the 
party held there on the day of Wally's murder (R. 205:91). The grandfather explained 
that the police had been called because he and his son were fighting (R. 205:91). Counsel 
then asked whether defendant left the house when the police arrived (R. 205:91-92). The 
grandfather replied, "No, he hid... . Because like I told you he was away from a halfway 
house" (R. 205:92). 
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On cross-examination, the State asked, "And who was the parole officer that you 
called to let them know that he was at your house after having run away?" (R. 205:97). 
The witness responded, "I didn't call" (R. 205:98). Defendant did not object to the 
State's question. 
Defendant then called his father, Frank Dominguez, Jr., who was also at the party 
on the day of Wally's murder (R. 205:130-31). On cross-examination, the father testified 
that defendant hid when police arrived that day, that he had been "hiding out" for several 
weeks, and that the father knew he was "wanted by the parole authorities" and "had 
absconded" (R. 205:143-44). Again, defendant did not object. 
Defendant then testified on his own behalf (R. 205:150). On direct examination, 
defendant admitted that he was in prison after being convicted of theft of a firearm and 
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle and that he had previously been incarcerated 
in the State of Washington (R. 205:151). Defendant then testified that when police came 
to his house on the day of the murder, he hid in the basement (R. 205:161). Defendant 
explained that he "[was] hiding from the police" because he had "absconded from 
supervision from parole" (R. 205:161), 
2. Defendant's inadequately briefed claim does not establish 
error, let alone obvious error. 
Defendant's second argument contains no citation to the record. See Aplt. Br. at 
27. Such omission is significant because, although defendant claims the State 
improperly elicited evidence uthat the defendant was wanted by the parole authorities, 
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that he had absconded, and that he was hiding from the police and parole authorities/' 
Aplt. Br. at 27, the State has found nothing in the record to support his claim. Rather, 
as indicated above, the record shows that it was defendant, not the State, who either 
elicited the challenged evidence himself or opened the door to such elicitation by his 
questioning of witnesses. C/. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1232 (Utah 1998) 
(rejecting defendant's evidentiary claim where "he actually opened the door concerning 
these statements"); State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting 
challenge to state's closing argument where defendant opened door to allegedly 
improper statements); State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 154 (Utah 1994). Furthermore, 
the record shows that defendant used the evidence in his defense to suggest that the 
reason he hid from police on the day of the murder and gave a false name to police 
shortly thereafter was not because he had committed the murder but, rather, because he 
had absconded from parole. Cf. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) 
(holding plain error doctrine "is in no way implicated if defense counsel consciously 
elects to permit evidence to be admitted as part of a defense strategy"); State v. 
Kingston, 2002 UT App 103, 1 22, 46 P.3d 761. 
Moreover, defendant's brief contains no legal authority to support his claim. 
Although defendant cites two cases, State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App. 
1990), and United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1987), for the 
proposition that courts will consider the admission of evidence concerning details of 
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prior convictions under the plain error doctrine, Aplt. Br. at 26, neither of these cases 
addresses defendant's claim concerning evidence of his parole status. 
Therefore, defendant's brief is insufficient to show error, let alone obvious 
error. See, e.g., State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, % 22, 53 P.3d 486. 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
B. This Court should reject defendant's inadequately briefed prison 
status claim where he provides neither record cites nor legal 
authority to establish plain error. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing the State, in presenting evidence 
concerning defendant's threat to a corrections officer, to include "information that the 
defendant was in the maximum-security facility at the prison,... that he was under a 
mental health watch for suicide, that the defendant was feeling homicidal, and that the 
two officers were forcibly removing his clothing." Aplt. Br. at 26. 
Defendant claims he preserved this claim below during a pre-trial hearing. Aplt. 
Br. at 24. However, as noted below, defendant raised no objection at that hearing. Thus, 
contrary to his assertion, he did not preserve this claim below. Consequently, defendant's 
claim is reviewed only for plain error. As before, defendant's inadequately briefed claim 
does not establish error, let alone obvious error. 
1. Proceedings below. 
Before trial, the State informed the trial court of its intent to present evidence that, 
while incarcerated before trial, defendant was involved in "an administrative function" 
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during which he threatened a corrections officer (R. 201:12). The State argued that, 
"[o]bviously we cannot put [the officers] on and go through any type of a foundation of 
who they are and where they work and how this statement came about without disclosing 
that the defendant's being housed at the Utah State Prison" (R. 201:12). Thus, the State 
asked for guidance from the court "as to how to proceed" (R. 201:12). 
Defendant responded: 
. . . Frankly, I don't—if—if they—we don't think that that 
confession is necessary, but I obviously can't—we couldn't constrict 
the State on how it presents its evidence and what it presents, if the 
Court deems it to be relevant. I mean, my position as defense 
counsel is that it's perhaps more prejudicial than probative, but I've 
spoken with the defendant about it. He understands that that 
information has already been out in the newspapers and so we 
don't—with that, we'd just submit the issue. 
(R. 201:13). The trial court then ruled: 
. . . I think that that comes in—comes in in the context in 
which it was made. No one has to go into the reasons as to why he's 
being housed there. That's, you know, irrelevant. The fact is that's 
where that statement occurred . . . and I—I just simply think that that 
has to be in context. 
(R. 201:14). 
In the State's case-in-chief, Lieutenant Doug Cook, a corrections officer at the 
Utah State Prison, testified that he had two meetings with defendant on April 10, 2001 (R. 
205:43). The first was in connection with an offender management review, in which the 
officers review an inmate's behavior to determine whether he should stay in the unit, be 
moved to a different section, or be moved out of the building (R. 205:43). There was 
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some discussion at that meeting that defendant should be moved to a different location (R. 
205:43). 
The second meeting occurred about a half-hour later when defendant requested to 
speak with a crisis worker (R. 205:43-44). In preparation for that meeting, Lieutenant 
Cook and Sergeant Dustin Hardcastle accompanied defendant into a conference room (R. 
205:44). Then, at the request of the crisis team, the officers began to cut off defendant's 
clothing "to ensure against him having anything that he could harm himself or others 
with" (R. 205:45). During that process, defendant said, "Cook, some day I'll get my 
hands on you and kill you like I did that other motherfucker" (R. 205:45). 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Cook, "What is the normal situation 
or what kinds of things do you see—why do they make that request [to see a crisis 
worker]?" (R. 205:46). When Cook responded, "I can't get into why they make the 
request," defendant again asked, "What kinds of explanations? In other words, are they 
feeling ill, are they suffering from a mental illness? What types of things would 
precipitate them meeting with a crisis worker?" (R. 205:46). Cook then responded, uAny 
time they feel homicidal or suicidal or feel that they're not mentally stable" (R. 206:46). 
Based on defendant's cross-examination, the State, on re-direct, asked Lieutenant Cook if 
defendant had made any statements about being suicidal, to which Cook responded "no," 
and if defendant had made any other statements about how he felt, to which Cook 
responded, "[h]e indicated he was homicidal" (R. 206:49). 
20 
The State then called Dustin Hardcastle, also a corrections officer at the prison (R. 
205:50). Hardcastle testified only that he overheard defendant's threat to Cook (R. 
205:51). 
On direct examination, defendant testified that, while incarcerated, he was 
subjected to an offender management review three times (R. 205:188). He also testified 
that, while at the prison, he was housed in "maximum security" or "super max" (R. 
205:188-89). He then claimed he never threatened Officer Cook (R. 205:189). He 
only said, "I didn't fucking do anything flicking wrong to be in this fucking building" (R. 
205:190). 
2. Defendant's inadequately briefed claim does not establish 
error, let alone obvious error. 
Defendant's argument here contains one citation to the record. See Aplt. Br. at 
26. The omission of additional cites is significant because, although defendant claims 
the State improperly elicited evidence "that the defendant was in the maximum-security 
facility at the prison, . . . that he was under a mental health watch for suicide, . .. and 
that the two officers were forcibly removing his clothing," Aplt. Br. at 26, the State 
has found nothing in the record to support these claims. Rather, as the record above 
indicates, it was defendant, not the State, who disclosed that he was being held in 
maximum security. Cf. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (holding that 
%6[i]f a party through counsel . . . has led the trial court into error, [this Court] will then 
decline to save that party from the error"). Moreover, it was defendant, not the State, 
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that initiated discussion of defendant's mental state at the time he threatened Officer 
Cook. Cf State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1232 (Utah 1998) (rejecting defendant's 
evidentiary claim where "he actually opened the door concerning these statements"); 
State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 1997; State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 
154 (Utah 1994). 
Defendant also provides no legal analysis to support this claim. Although 
defendant cites two cases, State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App. 1990), and 
United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that 
courts will consider the admission of evidence concerning details of prior convictions 
under the plain error doctrine, see Aplt. Br. at 26, neither of these cases addresses 
defendant's claim concerning evidence of his prison status. 
Therefore, defendant's brief is insufficient to show error, let alone obvious 
error. See, e.g., State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, 1 22, 53 P.3d 486. 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
C. This Court should reject defendant's claim concerning his 1996 
conviction for a drive-by shooting where he provides no legal 
authority or analysis to support i t 
Defendant claims the trial court improperly allowed Officer Rocky Gallegos to 
testify concerning his 1996 conviction for a drive-by shooting of a dwelling because "the 
details of the shooting were explored before the jury." Aplt. Br. at 27. 
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Defendant contends he preserved this claim below during a pre-trial hearing. Br. 
at 24. However, evidence concerning defendant's 1996 conviction was never addressed 
at that hearing (R. 201 :passim). Notwithstanding, defendant did apparently object during 
an unrecorded sidebar to the State's questioning defendant concerning his role in the 
drive-by shooting (R. 205:211, 222). 
A trial court's evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See State v. Eberwein, 2001 UT App 71, f 9, 21 P.3d 1139. Here, defendant's 
inadequately briefed claim does not establish an abuse of discretion. 
1. Proceedings below. 
The only reference in the State's case-in-chief to any of defendant's prior 
convictions was a passing reference during Detective Mann's testimony that defendant 
wanted to give information concerning Wally's murder in exchange for not going back 
to prison (R. 204:69). 
Defendant then called his grandfather as his first witness (R. 205:85). On direct 
examination, the grandfather testified that defendant was staying with him on the day of 
the murder because he had run away from a half-way house (R. 205:88). On cross-
examination, the State asked the grandfather whether he had called parole authorities to 
report defendant's half-way house departure (R. 205:97). The State asked a similar 
question of defendant's father (R. 205:143-44). 
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Defendant then testified in his own defense. Defendant opened his testimony by 
admitting that he had been convicted in 1996 of a drive-by shooting and that he had 
previously been incarcerated in Washington State (R. 205:151). Defendant testified 
that, on the day of Wally's murder, when his relatives heard him talking about a 
shooting, "[i]t was misunderstood what I said" (R. 205:162). Defendant explained that 
"[w]e were talking about what I went to prison for" (R. 205:162). Defendant further 
explained that he had gone to prison for "discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle" 
(R. 205:163). When defense counsel asked, "Did you discharge that firearm toward 
anybody?" defendant responded, "I was in the car. I didn't do the actual shooting" (R. 
205:163). On cross-examination, defendant admitted that he initially told police in 
1996 that "I know something about this case because I was there, but I didn't do it" (R. 
205:212). Defendant then testified, "I did not tell on my partners. They gave me a 
plea bargain and I took the plea bargain. . . . I didn't tell on my crime partners" (R. 
205:212). 
After defendant's testimony, the court noted for the record that it had previously 
ruled that the State could ask defendant questions concerning his 1996 conviction 
because "first of all the court felt that that door had been opened by the defense because 
they went into the fact that Mr. Dominguez had denied being the shooter in that 
particular case" (R. 205:221). Thus, the court "was persuaded that it was an issue of 
credibility" (R. 205:221). Finally, "the limited manner in which [the prosecutor] 
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wanted to go into it I felt balanced out as both being relevant and material and not 
overly prejudicial" (R. 205:221). 
In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Officer Rocky Gallegos, who 
had investigated the drive-by shooting of a dwelling for which defendant had been 
convicted (R. 206:31-32). Officer Gallegos testified first that no one was hurt in the 
incident (R. 206:32). He then testified that he had interviewed defendant in connection 
with the crime and that defendant initially blamed two other people for the shootings, 
which were directed at two different homes (R. 206:33-35). A few months later, 
however, defendant admitted in a written statement that he was the person who had 
done the shooting (R. 206:38-39). 
2. This Court should reject defendant's claim as inadequately 
briefed. 
Defendant's argument cites to two cases, State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 
(Utah App. 1990), and United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1987), as 
observing that "[generally, inquiry into the details of prior convictions has been found 
to be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error" and "[i]n such cases, the court will 
reach the issue on appeal despite the lack of objection." See Aplt. Br. at 26. 
However, defendant nowhere develops that authority nor provides reasoned analysis 
based thereon. Thus, he provides no explanation of how Tucker's observations support 
his claim. Consequently, he fails to establish any abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
ruling. See State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 1 33, 994 P.2d 177 ("[Cjourts will not find 
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plain error if the defendant explores the details of his prior convictions on direct 
examination or attempts to explain away the crime"); Tucker, 800 P.2d at 823 (holding, 
"[w]hen a defendant on direct examination 'attempts to . . . minimize his guilt/ a 
defendant may then 4be cross-examined on any facts which are relevant to the direct 
examination") (citations omitted); see also State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 
1982) (holding inquiry into details of prior conviction, though error, was harmless). 
Therefore, defendant's claim fails. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE 
TO THE ADMISSION OF TERRY BROWN'S STATEMENTS 
AFTER SHE WAS FOUND UNAVAILABLE WHERE DEFENDANT 
DID NOT PRESERVE THIS CLAIM BELOW AND DOES NOT 
ARGUE PLAIN ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
ON APPEAL 
Defendant claims "the trial court commit[ted] reversible error in allowing hearsay 
testimony by Detective Weloth of statements allegedly made by [defendant to] Teresa 
(Terry) Brown/' Aplt. Br. at 27 (capitalization omitted). Defendant claims the evidence 
should have been excluded because it did not meet the requirements of rule 804(b)(5)(B) 
and (C), Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 30. Because defendant did not raise this 
claim below and does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court 
should refuse to consider this claim on appeal. 
A. Proceedings below. 
At trial, Terry Brown was called as a witness by the State (R. 203:115). Terry 
admitted knowing defendant, meeting him at his aunt's home on October 15, 2000, and 
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giving him and a friend a ride to Roy that evening (R. 203:116). The prosecutor then 
asked, "In the course of that ride, what statements did this defendant make to you about 
activities he had been engaged in?" (R. 203:116). Terry refused to answer (R. 203:116). 
The prosecutor then asked, "Has someone threatened you, Ma'am?" (R. 203:117). Terry 
did not respond (R. 203:117). Terry then testified that she had spoken with Detective 
David Weloth about the statements defendant had made to her on the ride to Roy (R. 
203:117). However, she again refused to testify as to what those statements were (R. 
203:118-19). When Terry continued her refusal despite orders from the court to respond, 
the trial court held Terry in contempt and then excused the jury (R. 203:118-119). 
Outside the jury's presence, the prosecutor asked the trial court to find Terry 
"unavailable so we may put on her prior statement to Detective Weloth" (R. 203:121). 
Defendant's only objection was, "It's not anything that we have done. I am 
concerned—so we do object to that, for the record" (R. 203:121). Defendant then 
focused his attention on the prosecutor's question concerning whether Terry had been 
threatened, asking that, absent evidence of an actual threat, "that question be stricken and 
the jury be instructed to disregard that question" (R. 203:121, 123-24, 125). Although 
defendant did note, during that discussion, that "we had no idea she was on the witness 
list for the State until Tuesday," he never objected to Terry's testimony, or her 
unavailability, on that basis (R. 203:123). The court and defendant only discussed the 
State's reference to a threat and the need to provide a curative instruction striking that 
reference (R. 203:125-27). 
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Following this discussion, the trial court, based on Terry's refusal to answer the 
prosecutor's questions, made "a specific finding under the rule that she [was] 
unavailable" (R. 203:127). The Court then stated, "[S]o I think the State would be 
allowed at this point to call Officer Weloth and relate those statements" previously given 
by Terry (R. 203:128). Defendant stated only, "I just want the record to be clear that 
we've objected just in case there is an issue" (R. 203:128). When the trial court asked 
whether there was "anything else we need to cover," defendant raised no further issues 
(R. 203:128). 
B. This Court should reject defendant's unpreserved claim where 
he argues neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances on 
appeal. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal.'" State v. Johnson, 
114 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection at trial 
must "'be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error'" of which 
defendant now complains so that the court "'might have the opportunity to correct [it] if 
[the court] deems it proper.'" Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 
460 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 
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2000 UT 74, at f 11. Where defendant "does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' 
or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, [this Court will] decline to consider it on 
appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted); see 
also State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). 
Here, defendant failed to preserve this claim in the trial court. Although he 
objected to a finding that Terry was unavailable because "[i]t's not anything that we have 
done," (R. 203:121), defendant never objected to the admissibility of Terry's statements 
under rule 804(b)(5)(B) and (C). 
Furthermore, defendant does not allege plain error or exceptional circumstances on 
appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 27-30: 
Because defendant failed to preserve this issue for review, and fails to argue either 
plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court should not reach the merits of this 
claim. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; Jennings, 875 P.2d at 570. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S 
MISTRIAL MOTION WHERE DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT 
WHILE THREE WITNESSES LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR THE 
ALLEGEDLY INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND THEN FAILED 
TO REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE EXCUSED BEFORE 
CONDUCTING THE VOIR DIRE THAT ACTUALLY ELICITED 
THAT EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that "the trial court improperly denfied] [his] motion for mistrial 
after evidence of plea negotiationfs] was presented to the jury." Aplt. Br. at 31 
(capitalization omitted). However, because defendant invited the error upon which his 
motion was based, the trial court properly denied it. 
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"'A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial will not be reversed absent an 
abuse of discretion.'" State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, f 36,47 P.3d 115 (quoting 
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 54, 28 P.3d 1278). 
A. Proceedings below 
The first witness called on the fourth day of trial was Sergeant Valentine (R. 
205:3). Sergeant Valentine testified that on October 24,2000, he received a call from the 
county jail indicating that defendant "wished to speak to a detective because he wanted to 
confess to a crime" (R. 205:4). The Sergeant arranged for defendant to meet with 
Detective Lucas (R. 205:4-5). About twenty minutes later, Sergeant Valentine met with 
Sergeant Rodefer, Detective Lucas, and defendant in a video courtroom (R. 205:5-6). At 
that time, Detective Lucas began to review with defendant his constitutional rights (R. 
205:7). State's Exhibit 33 is a list of the rights reviewed with defendant (R. 205:6-7). 
Defendant indicated that he understood his rights and placed his initials beside each of the 
rights listed (R. 205:8-9). Sergeant Valentine then left the room (R. 205:10). 
Defense counsel raised only one objection to Sergeant Valentine's testimony. 
Specifically, counsel objected when Sergeant Valentine attempted to read the rights 
contained in Exhibit 33 (R. 205:7). Counsel explained, "Apparently this document was 
written by Detective Lucas and he's here to testify" (R. 205:7). On cross-examination, 
defense counsel asked Sergeant Valentine if defendant ever confessed to him (R. 205:12). 
The Sergeant replied, "No" (R. 205:12). 
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The State then called Sergeant Rodefer to testify (R. 205:14). Sergeant Rodefer 
testified that, on October 24, he had met defendant in a holding cell just prior to their 
meeting with Detective Lucas (R. 205:15). He subsequently accompanied defendant to 
the video courtroom where they met with Sergeant Valentine and Detective Lucas (R. 
205:15-16). Sergeant Rodefer then confirmed that the first sheet of paper in State's 
Exhibit 33 contained the list of rights reviewed with defendant and his initials indicating 
he understood those rights (R. 205:16-17). The second sheet of paper in that exhibit 
"was written out during the interview process with inmate Dominguez" (R. 205:16). It 
reflects "word for word" the statements defendant made during his conversation with 
Detective Lucas (R. 205:19). Detective Lucas would write down defendant's statements 
and then have defendant place his initials next to them (R. 205:20). Defendant then also 
signed the paper at the end of the interview (R. 205:20). 
Defense counsel raised only two objections to Sergeant Rodefer's testimony. 
When the State asked the Sergeant how defendant appeared during the interview and the 
witness testified that "[h]e knew what was—where he was at," counsel objected to that 
statement as "speculation" (R. 205:18). Then, when the State asked, "When the 
defendant made these statementsf,] did he appear to know what he was talking about?" 
counsel objected because the question "[cjalls for speculation" (R. 205:21). On cross-
examination, counsel confirmed that Detective Lucas had produced the statement 
contained in Exhibit 33 and that the conversation with defendant had not been videotaped 
(R. 205:21-22). 
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The State then called Detective Lucas (R. 205:23). Detective Lucas testified that 
he met with defendant, Sergeant Valentine, and Sergeant Rodefer on October 24 after 
learning that defendant wanted to confess to a murder (R. 205:24-26). Detective Lucas 
testified that the first thing he did was to review with defendant the rights listed on the 
first sheet of Exhibit 33 and to confirm with defendant that it was he who had initiated the 
meeting (R. 205:28-29). Sergeant Valentine then left the room (R. 205:30). 
At that point in Detective Lucas's testimony, defense counsel asked to voir dire the 
witness (R. 205:31). Counsel did not ask that the jury be excused before doing so (R. 
205:31). Counsel first asked the Detective if he knew whether defendant had been 









Okay. Did you write down every relevant statement that he 
made? 
Yes. I wrote down word for word actually. I said, okay, what 
do you want to say, then I started to write down what he said. 
He said Pm willing to plead to first degree murder, but there's 
two things that I want. 
At this point Til ask you, it's true, is it not, that he did not 
actually confess to murder in the sense that he said I murdered 
someone? 
Where is the voir dire? 
I agree. 
That is it, Judge. If the defendant did not confess to anything 
—this appears to be an attempt to negotiate and that is not 
admissible. From all appearances, the defendant was 
representing himself as his own attorney. Any attempt to 
negotiate is inadmissible to the jury. From my reading of the 
second page there's no confession here, only an attempt to 
negotiate a plea. 
State: The fact that the defendant doesn't say I'm guilty we do not 
believe doesn't mean that this isn't a confession. He said, as 
Detective Lucas said, I'm willing to plead guilty to first 
degree murder. 
Counsel: In exchange for other favors. That is an attempt to negotiate a 
plea and is not admissible. 
Court: We'll take a short recess, Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury. I 
need to take further discussion on this matter outside your 
presence. 
(R. 205:32-33). 
After the jury was excused, the court heard additional argument (R. 205:33-36). 
The court then held that defendant's statements were inadmissible because they 
constituted a plea discussion under rule 410, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 205:36). The 
court denied defendant's subsequent motion for a mistrial, stating: 
. . . You solicited that. Both of you take a risk when you 
decide to make these kinds of determinations before the jury. I think 
this is something that we should have taken outside the presence of 
the jury. 
. . . [I]t's not my job to protect either side from themselves in 
this particular situation. Either one of you could have asked to have 
the jury excused at that particular time. . . . 
(R. 205:38). Defendant then noted for the record that Detective Lucas's response 
disclosing defendant's plea offer "was nonresponsive" to the actual question asked (R. 
205:38). The court reiterated, "Like I said, both sides run a great deal of risk on 
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something that is what I consider to be, you know, controversial in the sense of whether 
or not it's admissible in front of the jury or not If you want a curative instruction I'll 
give you one, but I'll deny the motion for a mistrial" (R. 205:39). 
When the jury returned, the court stated: 
You heard testimony from Detective Lucas concerning a 
statement that was made by Mr. Dominguez in regards to his 
willingness to plead guilty. You are instructed at this point to please 
disregard that statement in its entirety. That is not a statement that is 
to be considered by you in your deliberations or in your discussions 
concerning this particular case. 
(R. 205:41). 
B. The trial court properly denied defendant's mistrial motion 
where defendant created the grounds upon which it was based. 
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that our courts will not save a 
defendant from harms at trial caused by his own action. Thus, our courts have 
consistently held that,4" if [defendant] disputefs] the competency of [any] evidence 
[offered at trial], he should make his objection at the earliest reasonable opportunity/" 
State v. Belgard, 811 P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Tuttle, 16 Utah 2d 288, 
292, 399 P.2d 580, 582 (1965)), reversed and remanded on other grounds, 830 P.2d 264 
(Utah 1992); see also State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561 (Utah 1987). "'He [is] not.. . 
permitted to wait until the questioned evidence was before the jury and . . . then claim that 
it was not admissible.'" Belgard, 811 P.2d at 214 (quoting Turtle, 399 P.2d at 582). 
Along the same line, our courts have consistently held that "'a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing 
34 
the error/" State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, \ 54, 989 P.2d 1091 (quoting State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)); see also State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 
(Utah 1997). 
The purpose of these rules is simple: they 4"prohibit[] a party from setting up an 
error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 
(Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Henderson, 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)). 
These same rules apply to motions for mistrial. See State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 
262 (Utah App. 1995) (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court improperly denied his 
mistrial motion where "defendant invited the potential error of which he now complains" 
by "declining] to avoid [it]"); cf. State v. Barney, 681 P.2d 1230, 1231-32 (Utah 1984); 
Ruth v. State, 757 A.2d 152, 160 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) ("[A] defendant who himself 
invites or creates error cannot obtain a benefit—mistrial or reversal—from that error."). 
These rules defeat defendant's claim. First, three witnesses—Sergeant Valentine, 
Sergeant Rodefer, and Detective Lucas—were called to lay foundation for the statement 
defendant gave police on October 24,2000. Because defendant was the one who gave the 
statement, one can assume defendant was aware of its contents. Moreover, during the 
first witness's testimony, a copy of defendant's statement was offered as an exhibit, and it 
is clear that defendant read the statement because he referred to it later during his voir 
dire of Detective Lucas (R. 205:33). Yet, despite his awareness of the evidence the State 
was preparing to elicit, defendant never objected to the anticipated evidence during the 
witnesses' foundational testimony. 
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In addition, although defendant knew Detective Lucas was the witness who would 
actually present the evidence subsequently challenged, defendant did nothing to avoid 
having that evidence brought before the jury. Rather, he actually elicited it on voir dire in 
the jury's presence (R. 205:31-33). Even then, defendant did not object to the detective's 
response (R. 205:32). Rather, he continued to question the witness until the State 
objected (R. 205:32). Only then did defendant raise his rule 410 claim, doing so still in 
the jury's presence (R. 205:32-33). 
On this record, defendant clearly had the opportunity to avoid the error upon which 
his mistrial motion was based. He could have objected to the anticipated evidence as 
soon as the State began laying foundation for it, or he could have requested a hearing 
outside the presence of the jury before questioning Detective Lucas further as to what 
occurred at the October 24 meeting. Defendant did neither. Thus, "defendant invited the 
potential error of which he now complains" by "declining] to avoid [it]." Price, 909 
P.2d 256, 262 (Utah App. 1995). 
Under such circumstances, the trial court properly denied defendant's mistrial 
motion. See id.; see also State v. Wragg, 1(A A.2d 216,220 (Conn. App. 2001) 
(affirming denial of mistrial motion where counsel should have anticipated witness's 
testimony and 44yet counsel made no effort to interrupt [that] testimony"); State v. 
Atkinson, 864 P.2d 654, 659 (Idaho App. 1993) (affirming denial of mistrial motion, 
holding "[a] misstep on dangerous ground, where counsel has voluntarily ventured but is 
unsure of possible responses, may result in invited error, and if so, cannot then be grounds 
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for a mistrial"); State v. Howard, 293 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1980) (affirming denial of 
mistrial motion where "[the prosecutor's] questions leading up to the question eliciting 
the evidence should have put defendant on notice that she was about to elicit the 
evidence" and yet "defense counsel delayed objecting until afterward"); Wilson v. State, 
44 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex. App. 2001) (affirming denial of mistrial motion where, despite 
the opportunity to do so, defendant did not object to the offensive evidence until after it 
was elicited and "did not present any reason to justify his delayed objection").1 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
*In making its invited error argument, the State in no way concedes that 
defendant's October 24th statements were inadmissible under rule 410, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Rule 410, in relevant part, excludes only statements "made in the course of 
plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority " Utah R. Evid. 
410(4) (emphasis added). In this case, no attorney for the prosecuting authority was 
present when defendant made his statements. Thus, his statements were admissible under 
rule 410. See Utah R. Evid. 410(4); see also State v. Anderson, 866 P.2d 327, 330-32 
(N.M. 1993) (interpreting rule not to require exclusion of plea offers made to police 
officers after administration of Miranda warnings unless court finds "that the statements 
were made with the belief that they could not be 'held against' the declarant"); People v. 
Rollins, 759 P.2d 816, 818 (Colo. App. 1988) (holding "spontaneous statements made by 
an arrestee to an officer other than a prosecuting attorney are not inadmissible 'plea 
negotiations'"); State v. Taylor, 336 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Iowa 1983) (holding defendant's 
statement that he was willing to plead guilty, made to police after administration of 
Miranda warnings, was not inadmissible plea negotiation). Consequently, defendant 
cannot show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his mistrial motion. See 
State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, f 11, 55 P.3d 1158 (holding appellate court may affirm 
trial court ruling on any basis apparent on the record even if not relied upon below). 
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V. EVEN IF ERROR DID OCCUR BELOW, DEFENDANT CANNOT 
SHOW PREJUDICE WHERE THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE 
AGAINST HIM IS COMPELLING 
Defendant claims that uthe cumulative effect" of the errors he alleges on appeal 
"constitute harm to the defendant and require reversal.1' Aplt. Br. at 32, 37. Defendant's 
claim lacks merit. 
The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal "only if the cumulative effect of 
the several errors undermines . . . confidence that a fair trial was had." State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah App. 1997). 
Here, as explained above, defendant has not established that any errors occurred* 
See Points I-IV, supra. 
Moreover, even if errors did occur, defendant cannot establish that such errors, 
individually or collectively, were harmful. Even absent the evidence challenged on 
appeal, evidence of defendant's guilt was compelling: 
1. Waleed Mahamd Elalawnah ("Wally") was shot to death while 
bending over an ice machine in his store, Boulevard Market, at about 
12:30 p.m. on October 15,2000 (R. 203:33-34, 39-40, 51-52, 
102-03,145-53,224). 
2. A glove mark was found on a column of the Boulevard Market (R. 
203:232-33,247). 
3. Ricarla Dominguez, defendant's grandmother, told police that 
defendant had left a family party around noon on October 15 and, 
when she saw him again later that afternoon, he was bragging to 
children that he had committed the murder (R. 203:78-79, 80, 90, 
92). 
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John Dominguez, defendant's uncle, was at the family party on 
October 15, 2000, and heard defendant "bragging . . . that he had 
shot somebody" (R. 203:102). When a news report came on about 
Wally's murder later that evening, John heard defendant admit he 
had done it (R. 203:102-03). 
When police were called to the party on an unrelated matter later that 
day, defendant hid in the basement until they were gone (R. 203:84; 
R. 205:92, 161). 
Four days after the murder, police were called to investigate a 
residence after receiving a complaint about drug use (R. 204:60-61). 
Officer's found defendant at the residence (R. 204:61). When they 
asked defendant his name, he initially identified himself as Matt 
Rader (R. 204:62). He was subsequently arrested for providing false 
information to the police (R. 204:62). 
On the way to jail, defendant told the transporting officer that he had 
information concerning Wally's murder (R. 204:63-64). 
Defendant subsequently met with detectives to share his information 
(R. 204:66, 88). After first implicating two other people, defendant 
confessed to killing Wally (R. 204:70-77, 89-105). 
Defendant memorialized his confession in a signed statement to 
police (R. 204:107-13). 
Defendant then accompanied the police to Boulevard Market and re-
enacted the murder (R. 204:114-28). 
Defendant's confessions and re-enactment of his crime were 
consistent with the location of the shooting in the back room of the 
store, with the location and severity of Wally's wounds, and with the 
location of the glove print found on the store's column (R. 203:155, 
167; R. 204:104,110-13, 114-25). 
Analysis of the shorts defendant admitted wearing during the murder 
indicated the presence of gun powder residue consistent with a 
recently discharged firearm (R. 204:16-17, 50). 
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13. While incarcerated, defendant told a corrections officer, "someday 
I'll get my hands on you and kill you like I did that other 
motherfucker" (R. 205:45, 51). 
In light of this evidence, defendant cannot show that the errors he now alleges, 
even if they did occur, resulted in any harm to him. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 
501-02 (Utah 1986). 
Consequently, defendant's cumulative error claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED H_ December 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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